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      The Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate had a very complex economic 
relationship that lasted for over three centuries.  This relationship revolved, in part, 
around the capture, sale, and taxation of slaves who were taken on the Russian steppes 
and beyond.  This trade was centered between Istanbul d the major trade ports of the 
North Black Sea system.  From the trade’s official beginnings in the 1450s to its near-
death in the eighteenth century, it grew consistently.  This growth is directly attributable 
to social and economic realities in Anatolia.  These include the empire’s 
bureaucratization1 of the slave trade so as to increase tax revenue, the sultan’s subsequent 
urging of the khan to increase slave raids, and Anatolia’s persistent need for slaves 
caused by its people’s adherence to Islamic principles regarding slavery.  These confluent 
streams regarding the slave trade created a persistent and growing demand for slaves 
from Anatolia from the trade’s bureaucratization in the 1450s to its end at the hands of 
Russian Emperor Peter the Great.  This pattern show that the Ottoman Empire and the    
                                                           
1 By “bureaucratization” I am referring to the Ottoman practice of taxing new sources of revenue by 
passing laws regulating the harvest and exchange of res urces.  Consequently, this creates a large papr 
trail handled by an extensive system of Ottoman burea crats. 
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Crimean Khanate existed within a core-periphery relationship, with economic and social 
realities in the Ottoman core influencing activities n the Crimean periphery. 
 
Historiography and Sources 
 The Crimean Khanate was a breakaway state from the Golden Horde which, after 
winning independence from the Horde, became an autonom us state in the north Black 
Sea.  As such, the Crimean Khanate adopted and continued the region’s well-established 
economic system, most notably the slave trade.  While t ere are several historians who 
discuss the slave trade in Anatolia and the Crimea separately, few have discussed the 
trade as a singular entity, and far fewer have focused on this exclusively through the lens 
of the slave trade. 
 The historiography of the Ottoman Empire has a lengthy tradition, with a 
veritable army of scholars dissecting one of the largest and longest-lived empires in 
history.  There are several notable scholars who have made grand contributions to the 
field.  Five of these authors are Halil Inalc ık, Donald Quataert, Saraiyah Faroqhi, Şevket 
Pamuk, and Bruce McGowan.2  
 Inalcik and Pamuk stand out especially as both early modern and economic 
historians, a group greatly aided by Ottoman bureaucratic practices that produced a 
wealth of sources.  Regardless of the criticisms placed on the empire by different 
historians, the empire was very thorough in its bookkeeping practices.  Such practices 
                                                           




were necessary in running such a heavily centralized and patrimonial system.  All assets 
of the empire were ultimately owned by the sultan.  Taxes on these assets, which were the 
lifeblood of the empire and which provided a majority of the Porte’s budget, were 
therefore thoroughly documented by trusted officials sent from the Porte.  Inalcik has 
made immense contributions to the field by capitalizing on these documents.  His 
translations of the Customs Tax registers at Caffa are a cornerstone of understanding 
early Ottoman trade relations with the Black Sea economic system.  He has translated 
several maliye3 finance ministry documents held at the Topkapı Sarayi archives in 
Istanbul.  Inalcik’s summary of this wealth of economic data is in his two-volume edited 
work, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire.4 
 Sevket Pamuk’s contributions are no less important.  He has written several 
articles and books which discuss the power and value of Ottoman currency.  He has 
compiled detailed and lengthy charts listing price changes of several commodities from 
lumber to grain over several centuries.5 Both Pamuk’s and Inalcik’s works are the 
primary starting points for any scholar wishing to explore early modern Ottoman 
economics.   
 While all of these authors have made invaluable contributions to the field, they 
are plagued by the problem of all Ottoman historians in that a majority of our available 
                                                           
3 The maliye was the Ottoman financial ministry, which was famous for its thorough bookkeeping practices 
and extensive bureaucracy.  All taxes collected by the empire were recorded in documents at the maliye.  
For more information see Linda T. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Fi ance 
Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660: Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage (Boston: Brill 
Academic Publishers, 1996). 
4 Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: vol. 1, 1300-
1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
5 Sevket Pamuk, “Economic History of the Ottoman Empire.” University of Connecticut, 2000, 
http://www.ottoman.uconn.edu/data.html, accessed 7 April 2014. 
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data is tied to the elite center of the empire.  The further one moves away from the sultan, 
the more sparse documentation on daily life in the early modern empire becomes.  
 This bias of information toward the Ottoman center of power slightly precludes 
complete discussions of any topic that includes non-elites, especially slavery and the 
Crimean Khanate, the foci of this paper. 
 While there are a great number of works on Ottoman sl very, they fall in line with 
this data problem and focus almost exclusively on Janissaries and palace slaves, whose 
lives are well documented; a quick online search will yield a wealth of popular history 
books by authors such as Godfrey Goodwin or David Nicolle on the subject.6  Madeline 
Zilfi discusses this elite slave narrative bias as a key component in the ignoring of the 
story of female slaves in the empire, as women were not discussed in the context of 
Ottoman military slavery.7 
   This has created a treatment of the early modern Ottoman slave trade that is less 
negative than treatments of the later Atlantic slave trade and that tend to emphasize the 
unique upward mobility of military slaves in the empire.  Commentaries on non-palace 
slavery-such as domestic slaves and agricultural slave -are therefore largely from non-
Ottoman (usually European) sources.  Mikhail Kizilov’s Slave Trade in the Early Modern 
Crimea from the Perspective of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources8 discusses the 
problems of relying on these foreign sources, with their inherent confessional biases.  
                                                           
6  Godfrey Goodwin, The Janissaries (London: Al Saqi Books, 2006); David Nicolle, The Janissaries 
(Oxford:  Osprey Publishing, 1995). 
7 Madeline Zilfi, Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 
104. 
8 Mikhail Kizilov, “Slave Trade in the Early Modern Crimea from the Perspective of Christian, Muslim, 
and Jewish Sources,” Journal of Early Modern History, 11, no. 1/2, (2007): 1-31. 
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Major authors such as Omer Lütfi Barkan do not emphasize agricultural slavery in the 
Ottoman Empire past the sixteenth and seventeenth cturies; in fact, Barkan contends 
that agricultural slavery becomes the least common of slave activities.9 Determining the 
percentage of slaves who engaged in agricultural activities is difficult because the entire 
number of slaves in the empire at any given time is not known.  Agricultural slavery, 
however, was at least a major enterprise of borderland rejuvenation, as we shall see.  
Again, the inherent problem of our historiography is the paucity of outside sources the 
further one moves away from the center of power. 
 It is these outside sources, however, that become our primary vehicles for 
discussing the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, especially the Crimean Khanate 
borderland.  Because the Crimean khans’ bureaucratic t dition was at best limited, we 
cannot directly determine how many slaves they captured within a given year or see the 
exact fate of these slaves.  These numbers must instead be extrapolated from 
administrative registers in the victims’ regions.  Much of this computational work has 
been done by Alan Fischer, who neatly used the work of eighteen Russian, Ukrainian, 
and Polish historians to estimate the volume of khanate slave raids per year.10 
 These figures can be further complemented by the work of Inalcik, specifically 
his translation of the records of customs tax revenues earned by the Ottoman Empire each 
year on the slave trade.  Combining estimates on the umber of slave raids by the khanate 
with estimates on the money made by the empire fromtaxing slaves entering through 
                                                           
9 Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 
88. 
10 Alan Fisher, A Precarious Balance: Conflict, Trade, and Diplomacy on the Russian-Ottoman Frontier 
(Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1999). 
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northern ports, and then comparing them with Ottoman policies and attitudes toward the 
khanate, allows us to determine out the correlation of these factors. 
 The scholarship on the slave trade, thanks in great part to authors like Pamuk, 
Inalcik, and Fisher, has created a great wealth of sources for discussing the economics of 
slavery and the Crimean-Ottoman connection.  I will show that the Ottoman Empire 
became dependent on slavery, both on its actual practice as well as on the revenue made 
from taxing it.  Given that the primary source of slaves in the Ottoman economic sphere 
was its northern borderland and the Crimean Khanate, the empire had to politically 
position itself to the khanate in order to ensure that he khan remained both a semi-
autonomous subordinate and an ally.  
 Through the lens of the slave trade this relationship of power becomes readily 
apparent.  Fisher’s data on slave raiding shows a positive trend, which I discuss below.  
As the Ottoman Empire became more dependent on slaves, demand for such slaves 
increased even when there was economic instability in Anatolia.  The factors behind this 
dynamic are the main focus of this paper.  From Islamic prescriptions ensuring that new 
slaves were always in demand, to government projects r quiring slave labor, the need for 
slaves in Anatolia always trended upward.  This dynamic is partially shown in both the 






BEGINNINGS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMANS AND THE KHANATE 
 
Historical Introduction of the Crimean Khanate 
The cities on the Crimean Peninsula and the Sea of Az v served as the frontier 
between the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy.  This mutual borderland was heavily 
populated and was a hub of commerce among Italy, Byzantium, Poland, Russia, and 
Asia.  Its chief city of commerce, Caffa11, was originally a Genoese trading colony 
established in 1266 by an agreement with the Mongol khan.  Within one century Caffa 
became the center of an expansive and wealthy tradesyst m.  The Genoa State Archive’s 
Diversorum Filze12, a collection of correspondence to the doge of Caffa dated from 1375 
onward, mentions trading activities reaching from Trebizond to Lithuania.  
 The slave trade proved to be both a profitable entrprise for the Italians and a great 
point of contention for the Mongol Horde. The Mongols took great offense at Italian 
foreigners engaging in the kidnap and trade of Turkic peoples.  This offense resulted in 
                                                           
11 The two most common names for this city are Caffa (Italian) and Kefe (Turkish). فك تلاا; Eyālet-i 
Kefê.  Both names are used frequently in secondary lite ature on the subject.  For the sake of continuity I 
will use the Italian.  The city is currently within Russian national borders and called Feodosiia, a slight 
Slavicizing of the original Greek name. 
12 S.P. Karpov, “New Documents on the Relations Betwen the Latins and the Local Populations in the 
Black Sea Area, 1392-1462,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 49 (1995): 33. 
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the siege and destruction of Caffa in 1307, only for the Mongols to invite the Italians 
back in 1312 under a new khan and allow the Italians to reestablish the slave trade.13 
Despite these problems, the Genoese had already linked the Crimea and the slave trade to 
a larger world economic system, setting a precedent for khanate exploitation of Italian 
trade routes. 
  The beginnings of the Crimean Khanate were contemporaneous to troubles with the 
Italian trading colonies.  Once the Golden Horde had established an extensive Eurasian 
land empire, many of its component parts began to itegrate with local populations and 
then eventually separate politically from the Golden Horde.  The Crimean Khanate was 
among these splinter groups that had established themselves in the northern Black Sea, 
using the geographical isolation of the Crimea to vie for sovereignty from the Horde.  As 
Fisher has noted, the Crimea served as a refuge for “…unsuccessful aspirants to the 
[Golden Horde] throne.”14 This seemed to be the perfect environment for launching a 
rebellion against their former Mongol masters.  After a lengthy war from 1420 to 1441, 
the Crimean Khanate became an independent state with a complex and sovereign political 
system.  The Khanate’s political institutions were very much related to those of the 
Golden Horde, while maintaining their own local practices.   
  While the khanate was politically separate from the Golden Horde, the former 
maintained many core administrative and succession practices from the Horde. The 
khanate was a loose confederation of nomadic tribes ostensibly ruled by the Giray clan 
                                                           
13 Caffa’s slave trade proved to be an ongoing flashpoint between the Italian trading colonies and the kans.  
The city would be besieged again in 1348.  According to an Italian witness to the siege, Gabrielle de 
Mussis this was when the primary transmission of the Black Death to Europe began due to the Mongols 
launching of infected corpses over the city walls. 
14 Alan Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 3.   
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from the fifteenth century until its demise in the eighteenth century. Under the Giray clan, 
the khanate respected the old political institutions f the Golden Horde despite the 
former’s push for sovereignty.  The Crimean khans were not absolute rulers and had to 
respect the authority of the Karachi begs, the chieftains of the four most powerful clans, a 
practice dating back to the Uzbek khans of the Horde.15 While it is difficult to ascertain 
the extent to which the Karachi begs checked the khan’s authority, in the early years of 
the khanate their signatures were required on any treaty signed by the khan in order to be 
legitimate.16 The founder of the Giray dynasty, Haci Giray, was invited by other clan 
leaders to become the Crimean khan and drew authority from his Ghengisid bloodline. 
This gave him primacy among the clan begs.   
This is the political context in which the khanate’s slave raiding and initial contact 
with the Ottoman Empire occurred.  From this point forward the khanate became a 
semiautonomous vassal state providing Anatolia withthe majority of its slaves.  This 
trade caused the two powers to develop a very complex but financially beneficial 
relationship. 
 
Ottoman Involvement in Crimean Khanate Politics 
  In 1475 Haci Giray’s son Mengli, who acceded to the throne in 1466, requested 
Ottoman assistance in driving out the Italian presence on the peninsula.  The Ottoman 
                                                           
15 Manz lists the four main clans as Shirin, Barin, Qipchak, and Arghin.  She recognizes the ambiguity and 
difficulty in identifying the exact clans as information on khanate political structure comes from a serie  of 
correspondences with Muscovy from the years 1476 to 1515.  These are, however, the four that appear 
most frequently in the correspondence.  For more information see Beatrice Manz, “The Clans of the 
Crimean Khanate 1466-1532,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 2 (1978): 282. 
16 Manz, “The Clans of the Crimean Khanate 1466-1532,” 286. 
10 
 
Sultan Mehmed II used this opportunity to increase the Porte’s military presence in the 
North Crimea and sent his admiral Gedik Ahmet Paşa.17  Subsequently the steppe 
political system would become much more centralized with a definite Ottoman presence, 
a process catalyzed and encouraged by the Ottoman Porte.  This centralization benefitted 
the Porte in that the empire could eventually control the khanate’s succession. The 
empire’s ultimate interest in such control was predicated on Crimean stability, a steady 
supply of slaves, and agricultural export.   
As the khanate came under the influence of the Sublime Porte, the khan and the sultan 
established a co-operative relationship.  When the Ottoman Empire annexed a province, it 
did so in stages, beginning with increasing tribute and concluding with the replacement of 
local officials and administrative systems by the Ottoman Timar system.18 Mehmed II did 
not attempt to impose this system on the khanate.  Once Mehmed II assisted the khanate 
in driving out the Genoese from the Crimean shore, he captured Mengli Giray, later 
releasing him for accepting Ottoman suzerainty.  Mengli Giray did not understand 
himself as a vassal but as an Ottoman appointed official (tikme).19 Some scholars such as 
Simon Sebag Montefiore suggest that the khanate’s bloodline came to be known as the 
Ottoman’s “…third international tradition…”20 and that the khan himself was an Ottoman 
official as Mengli Giray believed himself to be.  Regardless of this relationship’s finer 
                                                           
17 Theoharis Stavrides, The Sultan of Viziers: The Life and Times of Ottoman Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha 
Angelović 1453-1474 (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2001), 65. 
18 Inalcik and Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: vol. 1, 1300-1600), 13.  
The Timar system was the Ottoman military-administrative system.  It involved a large grant of land given 
to an Ottoman official under the strict condition that regular revenues as recorded in the Tahrir surveys 
were collected and given to the sultan.  This system ensured the strength of the central government as 
officials could be replaced or arrested for failing to meet the conditions of the original agreement.  For
further discussion on the nature of this system and its epartures from European feudalism, see Daniel 
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007). 
19 Halil Inalcik, “Struggle for East-European Empire 1400 – 1700: The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the 
Rise of the Russian Empire,” Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 21 (1995): 2. 
20 Simon Sebag Montefiore, Prince of Princes: The Life of Potemkin (London, 2000), 244. 
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details, it is clear that the khan was held in higher regard than other foreign rulers.  This 
special relationship can be explained by the two state ’ mutual sociolinguistic heritage.  
The Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire were both Islamic states with Turkic 
peoples, and they shared the common ideological heritag  of the Islamic steppe warrior.21 
In respect to their Islamic tradition, they both occupied similar goals in expanding the 
dar-al-Islam22 through conquest.  With these commonalities in mind, the sultans allowed 
the khans to administer their own internal affairs nd did not collect a regular tribute.  
Instead, the sultan used them as a source of troops, but more importantly encouraged their 
slave-hunting activities so as to have a constant source of labor for the Porte.  This 
relationship lasted for over two centuries. 
The khans eased into their role as important members of a new economic order 
centered on Istanbul.  The warfare and trade in which they engaged played a crucial role 
in Ottoman and Russian foreign policy for better or for worse.  The khanate’s political, 
economic, and subsistence structures evolved over tim  in order to facilitate Istanbul’s 
need for slaves. Over time the khans became increasingly less autonomous, though they 
were never fully vassals of the Ottomans. 
In order to better understand this complex relationship, we can analyze letters 
between the khan and the sultan from several points f time in their relationship.  The 
largest collection of these letters was translated into French by Mihnea Berindei and 
                                                           
21 The Ottoman Empire was certainly a multi-ethnic empire with subjects from several major language 
groups including Indo-European, Semitic, and Turko-Altaic, but the language of government and elite 
society was High Ottoman Turkish, a Turkic language with a wealth of Arabic and Persian borrow words.  
The mutual cultural association of Islam and Turkic language certainly played into the special role 
occupied by the khanate. 
22 The “house” or “domain” of Islam.  Frequently used in reference to all lands occupied by an Islamic 
state, especially refers to lands contested with infidels. 
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Gilles Veinstein.  The specific letters they translted were found in the Topkapı Sarayi 
archives in Istanbul.  These letters provide an insight into the power dynamic that existed 
between the two states. 
 
Letters between the Khanate and the Porte 
The khan’s deference to the sultan is readily observed in both the introductions 
and the content of their correspondence with each other.  Several letters between the 
Porte and the various khans were translated from the Topkapı archives.  The letters date 
from 1453 to the end of the eighteenth century.  One of the earliest translated letters 
between Khan Mengli Giray I and Mehmed II was written in 1479.  Its tone of prostration 
is seen in the opening lines: 
Who had the splendor of the sun, the majesty of sovereignty, the freshness 
of heaven and the glory of Adam who is raised as high as the stars, vast as the 
sky, who possesses the help of Huma, the radiance of th  sun, the justice of Kesra 
[Chosroes], the generosity of hatem, the throne of Iskander, the good fortune of 
Suleiman, who is the sovereign ruler of sovereigns of our time, which provides 
safety and security, protects justice and the doers f good, in the shadow of God, 
and who is the generous king, rich in generosity and justice, exterminator of 
heretics and polytheists, the perfect vanquisher of the universe, rendering services 
to religion, and assistant to Islam and Muslims, protector of the people of truth, 
refuge [cave] of the people of Islam, defender of th se who have found the right 
path, slayer of transgressors, who propagates justice to the East and the West and 
who manifests himself as the perfect man on both horizons.23 
 
The pleading nature of this letter’s introduction is obvious, invoking classical 
images of power relevant to both Islamic and Ottoman Turco-Persian heritage.  What is 
even more curious is the khan’s reference to the sultan as his “frère”  (brother). This 
                                                           
23 Bennigsen et al., Le Khanat de Crimée  dans les archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapi (Paris: The 
Hague, 1978), 41, trans. Shawn Broyles; a letter from the Khan Mengli Giray to Mehmed II Fatih. 
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suggests a closeness with co-religionists not shared in the correspondences with the rulers 
of other nations.  This could be further debated as there is a tradition of Near Eastern 
kings using familial identifiers for each other, but certainly not for European rulers. 
  While this letter is certainly flattering and aggrandizing to the sultan, it still does 
not denote Ottoman influence in Crimean affairs.  Most letters from this era begin with 
similar addresses to the sultan.  In the same letter Mengli Giray then attempts to resolve a 
matter with the sultan wherein one of the sultan’s naval commanders has taken military 
action against his men around Caffa.  The khan pleas with the sultan to act as a brother 
and reminds him that “Kefe est votre ville tributaire, mais elle est aussi notre résidence”; 
Caffa is your tributary/dependent, but it is also our residence.24  
Ottoman authority over the khanate increased alongside income from major slave 
trading cities such as Caffa.  By 1547 the Ottoman central government was regularly 
sending military orders to the khan.  One such order commanded the Khan Sahib Giray to 
immediately strike back against Russian invaders at Uz k.  The letter ordering the strike 
employs authoritative language: 
  
No delay, no delay can be tolerated.  Act with diligence and depart on a 
relentless campaign.  In addition, we have ordered the bey of Caffa to chastise the 
heretic troublemakers.25 
 
The Crimean Khanate played an integral role in Ottoman military policy toward 
Russia, but posturing to the Porte’s northern neighbor was only one of many Ottoman 
                                                           
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid., 131. 
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concerns that the khanate handled.  The Crimean khas were also expected to honor and 
protect Ottoman trade agreements.  A 1574 letter from Selim II to Khan Devlet Giray 
demands that the khanate provide escort and protection for a functionary merchant of the 
Porte named Mikhail. 
Mikhail, one of the merchants of our imperial court, bearer of a sovereign 
and majestic order, model of the notable men of the C ristian nation, charged 
with the purchase of sable and other merchandise detined for our imperial court, 
is sent to the land of Muscovy.  This mission is very important and necessary.  He 
must be able to arrive in complete security to the said land.  When the said 
merchant arrives bearing our joy-dispensing letter, you—observing the customs of 
former times and in conformity with the loyalty and fi elity that you have always 
shown to the sublime Porte—must do everything necessary to accompany the said 
merchant with an appropriate escort, so that he might, safe and sound, arrive there 
and return in stages to our blessed threshold.26 
By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Porte’s interactions with the 
khanate resembled a relationship with a subordinate client state rather than with a 
mutually respected co-religionist state.  While there are many factors contributing to the 
increasing Ottoman influence, such as a family and tribal disunity weakening the position 
of the khan, Ottoman need to increase revenue and take advantage of the weakness of the 
khan was an integral part of Ottoman policy and influence in the Crimea.   
 Despite the special relationship that existed betwe n the two powers on an 
ethnolinguistic and confessional basis, the sultan and the khan were occasionally at odds, 
with the Porte constantly trying to bring the khanate within its bureaucratic structure.  
There are several instances in which the khan outright efused aid to the sultan, although 
these refusals were mostly isolated to the earliest p riods of Ottoman-Khanate 
                                                           
26 Ibid., 138. 
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interactions.27  As their relationship continued, the Khan often would not refuse but 
would demand some sort of financial incentive to assist. By the end of the sixteenth 
century, most correspondence, such as the imperial order to Sahib Giray was strictly 
followed. This was likely due less to a fear of Ottoman reprisal than to economic 
integration of the slave trade.  It was mutually beneficial, especially in the late stages of 
the Ottoman-Crimean relationship, to maintain the revenue generated by slave raids.  The 
bureaucratization of the slave trade and the volume of its subsequent revenues caused not 
only more demand for slaving activity to supply Anatolia, but created the impetus for 
Istanbul to exercise increasing amounts of authority ver the semi-independent Crimean 
Khanate.  
These letters demonstrate that the power dynamic between the two, while 
complex, favored the sultan.  However, the letters show only deference and are not 
damning evidence of Ottoman involvement in khanate slave trade policy.  There are three 
letters from the late sixteenth century from the sultan, who explicitly encouraged the khan 
to increase the frequency and intensity of Tatar raids into Russia.28 Among these is a 
specific decree issued in 1586 under Murad III to the governor of Caffa ordering the 
latter to relax certain trade formalities in order to increase slave supply. 
Perhaps the most convincing example of increasing Ottoman control in the 
khanate came at the time of Mohammed Giray and his revolt against Ottoman authority 
                                                           
27 During the first Ottoman-Safavid War (1532-1555), Suleiman the Magnificent requested that the 
Crimean khan provide assistance in the form of 50,00  horsemen.  This request was declined.  On some 
occasions the khans asked for exorbitant fees to par ici te, Alan Fisher, A Precarious Balance, 31.   
28Alan Fisher, “The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire: Markets and Taxes on Slave Sales, Some 
Preliminary Considerations,” Beseri Bilimler-Humanities,  Vol. 6 (1978); Miihimme Defter LXII, 119 
(1586), 52; also Miihimme Defter VI, 624 (1564), pp. 29-30; XXIII, 248 (1573), 122; XXIII, 295 (1573), 
145; and LXVIII, =^116 (1590 - 1), 60, all to the governor of Kefe to encourage the Çerkes to supply more 
slaves; LXXII,  193 (1593-4), 101, to the governor of Kefe to encourage the Tatars to do the same.  As 
quoted on p. 171. I have tried to obtain these documents but it has proven to be very difficult. 
16 
 
in 1583.  His lack of willingness to fulfill his predecessors’ role of military support in the 
Persian campaign, along with his desire to keep the throne in his family, ran counter to 
the sultan’s view of this role.  This led directly o Mengli Giray’s overthrow and 
deposition in 1584 by the Ottoman sultan, a clear statement of power.29  Anti-Ottoman 
factions continued to exist within the khanate but the sultan always kept a firm hand on 
politics in the Crimea. 
  These letters in conjunction with hard economic evid nce suggest deliberation 
on behalf of the Porte in influencing Crimean affairs.  This represents a “core” state 
exploiting and eroding sovereignty in a “client” state for resources. 
The following section deals with the economic evidence of this exploitative 
dynamic.  It discusses the prevalence of slave raiding in the Crimea.  It also couples a 
graph showing an increase in slave raids in the Crimea with data discussing this increase 
as existing parallel to Ottoman economic involvement in the slave trade. 
 
Slavery and Slave Raiding in the Crimean Khanate 
  While the finer details of The Crimean Khanate political system are difficult to 
pinpoint, the khanate’s main source of income is not.  The Crimean Tatars were infamous 
throughout Kazan’, Astrakhan’, Poland, and Russia a the chief agents in the region’s 
slave trade.  This trade was a key socioeconomic institution within the Crimean Khanate.  
This study will focus on the slave trade between the k anate and the Ottoman Porte and 
                                                           
29 C.M. Kortepeter, “Āāzī Girāy II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the 
Caucasus, 1588-94,” The Slavonic and East European Review 44, No. 102 (1966), 143. 
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how changes in this institution spurred greater socioeconomic changes within the Black 
Sea system. Specifically, it will describe the demand for slaves created in Anatolia and 
how that demand affected Crimean Khanate policy and sovereignty. 
 The slave trade in the Black Sea region existed long before the predations of the 
khanate, all the way back to Byzantium.30 The fading influence of the Byzantines, 
especially after the Battle of Manzikert (1071), allowed groups like the Seljuk Sultanate 
of Rum to build their wealth on the region’s well-established slave trade.31 As mentioned 
previously, this trade was expanded from Anatolia to the Baltic by the Genoese trading 
colonies of the Crimea.  
 Under the leadership of the Giray dynasty, however, th  khanate continued this 
tradition with a new fervor that would leave a lasting social and economic trauma on the 
region.  The devastation their raids wrought on Poland and Ruthenia emptied the 
countryside and created a great amount of unrest among local Christian populations, 
resulting in a series of Cossack uprisings in the mid-seventeenth century.32 
 Several Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish folk songs from this period illustrate the 
impact of the raids on common people in these regions. 
 
The fires are burning behind the river— 
The Tatars are dividing their captives. 
                                                           
30 Fisher, A Precarious Balance, 28. 
31 C.M. Kortepeter, “Ottoman Imperial Policy and the Economy of the Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth 
Century,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 86 (1966): 87. 
32 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, The Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia ca. 1681 (Boston: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 4. 
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Our village is burnt and our property plundered. 
Old mother is sabred  
And my dear is taken into captivity. 
(a Ukrainian folk-song)33 
 
Folk songs and tales such as these were common.  Dariusz Kołodziejczyk points out 
that as late as 1948, a series of local village history projects produced an overwhelming 
number of tales about the Tatar horror.34 
Once the new captives were taken from their homeland, differing fates awaited them.  
In general slaves were destined to become the “plough and scythe”35 of their masters in 
agricultural endeavors.  Many became galley slaves who were purchased in great 
numbers by the Porte.36 Sometimes slaves became something more devious.  Evliya 
Celebi’s Sayahatname (record of travels during the mid-seventeenth century) discusses 
the practice of both male and female sex slavery in Anatolia and Tatary.37 It is important 
                                                           
33 Adrian Kashchenko, Opovidannia pro slavne Viis’ko Zaporoz’ke nizove, (Kiev, 1992), 29.  As quoted in 
Mikhail Kizilov, “The Slave Trade in the Early Modern Crimea From the Perspective of Muslim, Jewish, 
and Christian Sources,” Journal of Early Modern History 11 (2007): 1.  
34 Franciszek Kotula, “Warownie chlopskie XVII w. w ziemi przemyskiej i sanockiej” [Peasant strongholds 
in the districts of Przemysl and Sanok in the seventeenth century], Studia i materialy do historii 
wojskowosci VIII, pt. 1 (1962), 73-149. as quoted in Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “Slave Hunting and Slave 
Redemption as a Business Enterprise: The Northern Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth to Seventeenth 
Centuries,” Oriente Moderno 25 (2006): 149. Mikhail Kizilov’s discussion on “The Moral Side of the 
Crimean Slave Trade” points out the difficulty of determining the well-being of slaves as many accounts, 
mostly Christian, have an obvious bias against painting the Tatars in a humane light.   
35 Archiwum Glowne Akt Dawnych:  Archiwum Koronne Warsz wskie, Dzial Tatarskie, k. 61, t. 135, no 
277 (1661, Polish) as quoted in Mikhail Kizilov, “The Slave Trade in the Early Modern Crimea,” 14.  
36 Eizo Matsuki, “The Crimean Tatars and their Russian Slave Captives: An Aspect of Muscovite-Crimean 
Relations in the 16th and 17th Centuries,”  The Mediterranean Studies Group Hitotsubashi University 18 
(March 2006): 177. Matsuki writes, “In 1576 the Ottomans navy staffed twenty galleys with Slavic slaves, 
purchased 6000 slaves in 1579, and 4000 in 1590 as well.”
37 R. Dankoff & K. Sooyong, An Ottoman Traveler: Selections from the Book of the Travels of Evliya 
Celebi (London: Eland Publishing, 2010), 249.  There were many different forms of slavery in the Ottoman 
Empire and as such the subject cannot be addressed in a fashion similar to that of western slavery.  For
more complete discussions on the status of various slaves in Ottoman society during this period, see: 
Yvonne Seng, “Fugitives and Factotums: Slaves in Early Sixteenth Century Istanbul,” Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient 39 (1996), 140; Alan Fisher, “The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman 
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to note that Islam and the Islamic state were not always complicit in these practices.  The 
Qur’an is very clear about Islam’s position on slavery and placed restrictions on who 
could be made a slave, specifically non-Muslims captured in war.38  
The Qur’an simultaneously emphasized emancipation as a charitable act, a practice 
which was common and documented in countless Ottoman sources.  It is in fact the 
Qur’an’s encouragement of the emancipation of slave that caused a consistent demand 
for non-Muslim slaves from abroad and fed the need for increased slave raids into 
Christian lands throughout the sixteenth and sevententh centuries.  
The economic impacts of Tatar slave raiding were just as scarring as its social effects 
but were equally as profitable for the khanate. Theraids were so severe in Muscovy by 
the mid-seventeenth century that a separate fund39 was created by the Ulozhenie (law 
code) of 1649 to pay the ransoms of slaves captured by the Tatars.40 The amount of 
money exacted from those paying ransom can only be estimated but it was no doubt 
enough to be considered an integral part of the khanate’s economy.  A letter written in 
1533 from a khanate official to the sultan calls slave raids into Christian lands the source 
of the Crimean people’s prosperity.41 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Empire: Markets and Taxes on Slave Sales, Some Preliminary Considerations,” Beseri Bilimler-Humanities 
6 (1978): 151.  
38 The Qur’an has several verses on the practice of slavery and on the divine benefits of emancipating oe’s 
own slaves.  For more information reference these suras: Al-Baqarah 2:177; Al-Balad 90:1-15; An-Nur 
4:32-33; An-Nur 2:221. 
39 Fisher, A Precarious Balance, 28. 
40 A.G. Man'kov et al., ed., Sobornoe Ulozhenie 1649 goda: tekst, kommentarii (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo 
"Nauka," 1987), 27-28, 172-73; Russia; and Richard Hellie, The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649 
(Irvine, CA: Charles Schlacks, Jr., Publisher, 1988) 
41 Bennigsen et al., Le Khanat de Crimée , 121-25 as quoted in Halil Inalcik, “The Khan and the Tribal 




Khanate slave raids into Christian lands occurred annu lly from the early fifteenth 
century until the end of the seventeenth century, ceasing almost entirely due to the efforts 
of Tsar Peter I and his conquest of Azov.42 Once the khanate’s political structures were 
taken under suzerainty by the Ottoman Porte in 1475, Crimean slave raiding and trading 
would be permanently defined by Ottoman demand. 
  The extent of this demand can be partially measured by the averages of populations 
taken by slave raids over the time period of 1468 to 1688.  These figures show the 
enthusiasm of the Crimean khanate slaving machine over time, an enthusiasm directly 
affected by Ottoman need for slaves.  If we compare the flux in the number of slaves 
captured per year to contemporary economic realities in Anatolia, we can discern more 
complex themes concerning the relationship of the khanate to the Ottoman Porte and 
place the two powers appropriately within a core-periphery model.  Before we look at 
slave raiding data, it is necessary to emphasize the xtent to which slavery permeated 
Ottoman and Crimean society. 
Khanate participation in the slave trade relied largely upon and was perpetuated by 
the demand for slaves created by the Ottoman central government.  What is interesting 
about the khanate slave trade is its nature as a purely “economic”43 activity that did not 
seem to have any purpose other than to perpetuate iself and profit those involved. The 
lucrative profit of this industry was generated by its primary customer, the Ottoman 
central government, which purchased roughly seventy percent of Crimean imported 
slaves from the largest Black Sea slave market in Caffa.44 In turn, this industry’s primary 
                                                           
42 Fisher, A Precarious Balance, 45. 
43 Matsuki, “The Crimean Tatars and Their Russian Slave Captives,” 175. 
44 Fisher, Alan.  A Precarious Balance, 36. 
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customer would have quite an effect on the ventures of Crimean Khanate elites.  Cross 
referencing data on slave raids and primary source do uments on Ottoman policy allows 
us to define this effect. 
 
Historical Data 
Domination of the Black Sea slave trade had many beefits for those powerful 
enough to do so.  From the mid-fifteenth century until the nineteenth century, the 
Ottoman Empire reaped the extensive financial benefits of the slave trade, albeit at the 
cost of fomenting war with its neighbors.  This trade expanded greatly within the 
centuries during which it was under Ottoman “management,” a trend which is evidenced 
by historical data.  The Ottoman slave trade existed to fill a necessity within the empire 
but also existed as an enterprise growing for its own sake.  The more slaves that passed 
through the empire’s port cities, the more money was m de off of their trade, whether the 
slaves’ final destinations were in the empire or not.  This need to increase both actual 
slave populations in Anatolia (initially), combined with the need to collect increasing 
revenue from their trafficking, explains the immens demand created, a demand which 
could only be readily supplied en masse by the Crimean Khanate.  The following data is a 
representation of the average number of slaves taken per annum by the khanate during 
this period.  Its relevance operates under the assumption that Ottoman demand for slaves 
was a primary driving force behind khanate slave raiding. 
While the use of exact figures in historical research is problematic, it is important to 
analyze quantitative data to observe general trends in hi tory.  Figure 1.1 is a graph of the 
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average recorded number of slaves taken by Tatars from Poland, Kiev, Muscovy, L’vov, 
South Russia, Galicia, and Ukraine.  The “spikes” in the graph all correlate to events of 
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Figure 1.2   
 
                                                          
45 I compiled this data from figures in A. Fisher’s 
ambiguous figure such as “thousands” or no number at all.  Fisher compiled this data from several Russian 
and Polish historians: Neil Kressel; Khrisanf Petrovich Iashchurzhinskii; Mykhailo Hrushevskii; M. A. 
Alekberli; M. N. Berezhkov; Eudox
A. Novosel’skii; Maurycy Horn; D. I. Bagalei; Wiesław Majewski; Sieur de Beauplan; V. D. Smirnov; 
George Vernadsky; Bohdan Baranowski; Tiapkin; and the famous Ottoman traveler Evliya Cel
notes that many of the numbers are unreliable.  Many p rties, especially Polish and Russian historians, had 
an interest in inflating the numbers to emphasize the impact of Tatar raids.  This makes obtaining exact 
figures a pointless task.  However my argument requires the observation of macroeconomic trends rather 
than microeconomic events.  This graph likely provides an accurate picture of general size trends in slave 
raids over its time frame and is thus very helpful in discussing the largest
within the empire as they relate to creating commodity demand in the periphery.  Thanks to David Phillip 
Arthur Craig, a graduate statistician at Oklahoma State University, who provided four different graphs with 
a full write up on the statistical methods used.  He utilized a method known as Observation Oriented 
Modelling.  In summary, without the 400,000 slaves outlier, the graph trends slightly negative yet 65.05 
percent of the data suggests a positive trend.  The graphs provide
this paper.   
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iu de Hurmuzaki; Isaak Massa; V. A. Golobutskii; Georgii Koniskii; A. 
 and most sweeping changes 
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Discussion of the Data 
The two graphs provided are separate correlations of the same data with positive 
trend lines.  The reason for presenting the data in his way is to emphasize the tendency 
of slave raiding to increase over time regardless of mathematical outliers.  The large 
400,000 outlier is solely responsible for the positive rend in the first graph; without it the 
overall line is slightly negative.  This is not to say that slave raiding as an average 
decreased over time, which is not true, but to say sl ve consumption and therefore raiding 
had an upward tendency which was subject to social and economic realities.  The 
statistical write-up at the end of the document confirms that 65 percent of the data points 
to a general increase in slave raiding.  This general increase is shown in the second graph, 
which splits episodes of slave raiding before and after  time of great economic distress 
in Anatolia which caused overall consumption to decrease.  However, after this period 
consumption continues upward, as is shown by the second trend line in the red dots. 
There is a clear positive trend that reflects the reality of consistent increase in both 
slave raids in the borderlands and slave consumption in Anatolia.  One would expect the 
number of slaves required to meet Ottoman needs to eventually level out once those 
needs were met.  This is, however, not the case.  Due to several factors within Ottoman 
society, the need for slaves always fluctuated and almost always had a tendency to 
increase.  This trend is directly attributable to three factors.  The “dip” in this graph 
around 1600 likewise has an explanation which reflects conomic realities in Anatolia. 
 First, the Ottoman bureaucratization of the slave trade allowed the Porte to increase 
its tax revenue from the trade. By looking at the immense amounts of wealth and the 
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Porte budget’s subsequent dependency on the trade, we can see why the empire went to 
such lengths to have a beneficial and later controlling relationship with the khanate. 
Next, the prescriptions of Islam on slavery created an atmosphere in Anatolia wherein 
the slave population constantly needed to be replenish d.  Manumission was both a pious 
and common act.  Despite this, the need for slaves remained high and the main source of 
those slaves in both government and private enterpris s was the khanate trade. 
Finally, the low point in the graph shows that these three factors contributed to the 
upward trend in figure 1.1 and were the primary reasons for the intensification of slavery 
in Anatolia and Ottoman involvement in Crimean politics.  This low point coincided with 
the height of the Celali revolts, a series of interal conflicts in Anatolia which brought 
government activity to a screeching halt, and subsequently the empire’s purchase of 
slaves from the Crimea.  More importantly, this period seems to have been initiated by 
the events of 1571 wherein the Crimean Khanate sacked Moscow.  The number of 
captives taken listed in figure 1.1 and 1.2 are 100,0 , which marks it as a significant 
event.  The Russian reaction in the following year r sulted in the khanate’s defeat at the 
Battle of Molodi.  This study does not focus on theev nts at Moscow or Molodi due to 
the thesis’s emphasis on Crimean-Ottoman relations.  Further study into these events and 
using with the current data have the potential to provide new and important insight to the 
mechanics of the Black Sea system. 
 Conclusions 
The Crimean Khanate utilized a well-established trae system to prosper once it 
separated from the Golden Horde.  This trade grew to become the khanate’s most 
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profitable industry beginning in the mid-fifteenth century, so much to the point that the 
khanate was considered a “slave society.”46  Once the khans separated from the Golden 
Horde and created their own identity, they resumed and grew the region’s slave trade but 
only to the extent of fuelling their own need for slaves and supplying European traders 
with slaves. Once the khanate became a client state of th  Ottoman Empire, the slave 
trade increased dramatically.  The position of the k an quickly became subject to the 
sultan’s political needs.  As time wore on and slave raids increased, so did Ottoman 
income.  This situation, which mostly benefited thesultan, was deliberately created by 
Mehmed II and encouraged by later sultans.  An investigation into the revenue gained, 
based on the growing slave trade, will further illuminate the idea of the Porte creating a 
more profitable economic situation in the Crimea.  
                                                           
46 James Walvin, “Slavery,” Oxford Companion to Black British History, May 2009, 






SLAVE OWNERSHIP, BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE TRADE, AND REASONS FOR 
THE TRADE’S FLUCTUATION 
As an important foreword to this chapter it is necessary to outline the meaning of 
demand, which is an integral part of this thesis’s argument.  Demand, for slaves in this 
instance, is the economic term which references the ext nt to which a good fulfills the 
desire of the consumer.  In this case the demand of slaves is determined by how useful 
they were in agricultural and domestic enterprises owned by the Ottoman consumer of 
slaves.  As slave populations decreased in Anatolia, demand for them became greater 
because of the valuable purpose slaves served.  Demand in this context fulfilled the need 
to replenish slave populations.  The prevalence of slave ownership in the Ottoman 
Empire creates this demand, which tended to increase. 
Slave Ownership in the Ottoman Empire 
In order to emphasize the empire’s deep-seated interest in slaves from the Crimea, 
it is necessary to emphasize the extent to which slavery permeated Ottoman society. 
Slave ownership was very prevalent in Ottoman society.  While slaves could be found 
performing just about any duty that a free Ottoman subject could do, they were most 
often near the pinnacle of power in the Porte and consumed in large numbers by the 
political elite.  The military (askeri) and ruling class more specifically were the most
29 
 
prominent consumers of slaves.   Almost all palace servitors and military 
personnel closest to the sultan were or continued to serve as slaves.  It was not 
uncommon for the court’s highest functionaries such as the grand vizier to have hundreds 
of slaves.  Rüstem Paşa, the grand vizier under Suleiman the Magnificent, is recorded to 
have owned seventeen hundred slaves upon his death.47 The sultan had thousands of 
Janissaries in his service at any one time. However these slaves came from the peculiar 
Ottoman institution of Devşirme48 rather than a harvesting of the steppe. Slavery 
becomes less prevalent in Ottoman society the further away one moves from the court.  
Records left behind by the wealthy elite in Edirne (modern Adrianople) show that 41 out 
of 93 recorded estates owned slaves, or 140 individual slaves total.49 By the mid-
seventeenth century almost all palace functionaries were slaves of one type or another.50 
  The lower strata of society employed slaves but certainly not in the volume in 
which their social superiors did.  Slaves occupied all areas of peasant society from rural 
agriculture to urban crafts and trades.  Legal estat  records from Uskudar called sicilli 
defterleri list the slaves owned by the deceased and their value.51 Many of these estate 
records were kept by farmers and artisans who often nly needed around two slaves for 
the daily running of their estate.  The d fterleri discussed by Yvonne Seng lists 153 
                                                           
47 Steven Murray, Islamic Homosexualities: Culture, History, and Literature, (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997), 178. 
48 The Devşirme was an Islamic tax of the Ottoman state aimed specifically at non-Muslim populations.  It 
took one out of every forty boys and raised them near the Porte to be the sultan’s own guard and check 
against the Turkic nobility.  The practice began under Murad I but tapered off significantly in the sixteenth 
century.  For more information on the Devşirme, see Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, Social and 
Economic History of the Ottoman Empire vol 1, 1300-16 0, 283.  
49 Halil Inalc ık, “Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire,” 24-53 in Abraham Ascher, Tibor Kiraly, and T. 
Halasi-Kun, (eds.), The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European 
Pattern (New York: Brooklyn College, 1979) 25-43. 
50 Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report,” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 94, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1974), 440. 
51 Istanbul Seri'ye Sicilleri: Uskudar Series 6, volumes 3 and 6. 
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estates, only 11 of which employed slaves.  In the case of most businesses or farms the 
number of slaves per estate was equally small.  The number of slaves for one Musa’s 
estate of 25,550 akçe only employed two slaves.52 Madeline Zilfi states that at the end of 
the sixteenth century, roughly 20 percent of Istanbul’s population consisted of slaves or 
freedmen with half of those employed in Bursa or Istanbul’s artisan and silk industries.53 
Slaves came from many different places on the borderlands of the empire.  The 
main support we have for the khanate as the primary supplier of slaves to the empire is 
the overwhelming presence of slaves of Slavic and Circassian origin within local court 
records.54 A slave’s origin could possibly influence their fate.  Slave holders 
overwhelmingly demanded a flow of white Slavic slaves, while the “black” slave trade 
primarily fed the needs of Egypt and the Mediterranean. 
The status and quality of life for the slaves themslves varied, depending on their 
function and masters.  The most common legal mechanism applied to slaves was called 
the mukatebe contract.55  During the slave’s term of service, he or she would negotiate on 
a price to buy their freedom.  This was encouraged by the Islamic religious community, 
as manumission was considered a pious act.  Neverthel ss, slaves were not legally in 
possession of their labor or bodies and were treated s property.  Their appearance in 
estate registers right next to common household items attests to this widely-held 
                                                           
52 Seng, “Fugitives and Factotums,” 142. 
53 Zilfi, “Women and Slavery in the late Ottoman Empire,” 130. 
54  Yaron Ben Naheh, “Blond, tall, with honey-colored yes: Jewish ownership 
of slaves in the Ottoman Empire,” Jewish History 20 (2006): 317. 
55 Inalc ık, “Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire,” 24-53. 
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treatment.  The only exception made between regular property and slaves was the legal 
Islamic distinction between property “without a voice” and property “with a voice.”56 
This is a significantly darker picture of Ottoman slavery than has been depicted in 
previous approaches, which have emphasized the immense opportunities open to slaves.  
These positive arguments often cite the many viziers and military commanders of low 
birth who rose to prominence in the Ottoman political structure.  These experiences are 
unfortunately in the minority.  These experiences also usually occurred within the context 
of the sultan’s Devşirme tax, which could often be beneficial to slaves.  A majority of 
slaves, however, were bought in large city center markets and therefore did not have 
access to the much-celebrated upward mobility of the Ottoman kul. 
While largely confined to the elite, slave ownership was practiced in all layers of 
Ottoman society.  Farmers and artisans alike employed small numbers of slaves bought 
from their local markets. The upper-class and military employed thousands of slaves as 
palace functionaries, workers on their estates, and soldiers.  These slaves were acquired 
through a combination of market purchases and the Devşirme tax. 
  While there are no reliable estimates on the exact number of slaves within the 
entire empire at any one time, there are palace and court records, taxation registers, and 
personal accounts that support this thesis’s contention of an expanding slave trade over 
time. According to the data, this demand increased exponentially over just a century. 
                                                           
56 Ibid., 139. Sahillioglu, Halil 1985; mali samit and mali natik, respectively.  Property with a voice 
included cattle alongside humans.  For more on the Islamic legal concepts of property, see Itzkowitz, 
Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, 88. 
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  Mehmed II’s ascension to the throne began this trend by expanding the sultan’s 
slave-military compliment to 15,000 soldiers.  This number would reach 100,000 by 
1609.57 This trend unknowingly created an atmosphere of dependency on slave labor that 
would redefine the Ottoman Empire’s relationship with coreligionists across the Black 
Sea. 
Ottoman law regarding the reclamation of land also helped to encourage a 
demand for slaves.  Mehmed II’s plans for expanding a d revitalizing Istanbul from 1453 
to 1480 involved the resettlement of 163 villages to resume interrupted agricultural 
activity.  These settlements, known as Khasslar58, were populated by slaves bought from 
Mehmed II’s re-established slave trade in the north.59 
General consumption on all levels of society, government projects that utilized 
slave labor, the massive Ottoman military machine, and agricultural works in Anatolia all 
point to an extremely large demand for slaves in Anatolia and provide reasonable 
grounds to point to Anatolia as a driving factor in demand for the Crimean Khanate’s 
slaving activities.  By looking at Ottoman finances r garding the trade, this becomes 
more apparent. 
When we look at the vast amounts of money made by the Porte from this trade, it 
is not difficult to see why the sultans so heavily encouraged the practice and thus created 
demand and increased slave raiding.  
                                                           
57 Inalcik, “Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire,” 24-53. 
58  Khasslar lands were lands owned by the state and settled with slave labor as an attempt to create instant 
revenue for the Porte.  Mehmed II’s revitalization of Istanbul is the greatest example of this phenomenon.  
For more information regarding Khasslar see Halil Inalcik, “Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire,” 40. 




Ottoman Taxation and Revenue from the Slave Trade 
 The Ottoman state had been collecting taxes on slave  since the fourteenth 
century.  Murad I established the law of pencik, which provided the sultan one fifth of all 
slaves taken from the enemy in a time of war, with a ax of 25 akce per slave.60 Even 
before the official bureaucratization of the slave trade, that sultan had realized the 
importance of taxing the slave trade.  Murad I’s vizier noted specifically how detrimental 
it would have to have been to have foregone this tax. The tax on slaves vastly increased 
by the mid-fifteenth century with the creation of the first state-administered slave market. 
The first four points in figure 1.1 represent a steady increase in slaving activity from 
the late 1460s onward.  The first official slave market61 (esir pazari) was established by 
Mehmed II in Istanbul in the 1460s.62 The first “major” Tatar slave raids occurred in 
1468.63 While the Ottomans engaged in this trade from 1399 onward, this slave market 
was the first example of the Ottoman government bringing the practice under the Porte’s 
regulation as a source of state revenue.  From the trad port of Caffa alone the Ottoman 
Empire made over one million akçe in customs tax64 from the slave trade during the years 
1487 to 1490.  By 1526 to 1527, that revenue had increased to 2.5 million akçe.65  This 
                                                           
60  Kate Fleet, “Tax Farming in the Ottoman Empire,” The Medieval History Journal 6 (2006): 253. 
61 Fisher, “The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire: Markets and Taxes on Slave Sales, 151.   
62 Ibid, 171. 
63 Idem, “Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade,” Canadian-American Slavic Studies 6:4 (1972): 579. 
64 Inalcik, Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 280.  
65 Két tárgyalás sztambulban.  Hyeronimus Laski tárgyalás  a tӧrӧknel János király neveben.  
Habardanecz János jelentese 1528 nyari sztambuli tárgyalásairol [Two Sets of Negotiations in Istanbul.  
The Talks of Hyeronimus Laaski with the Turks in the name of King John.  The Report of Johannes 
Habardenecz on the Negotiations in Istanbul in the Summer of 1528].  Published by Gábor Barta.  Trans. 
by Gábor Barta and Jozsef Kun. Budapest, 1996, 138. As quoted in Pál Fodor and Géza David, Ransom 
Slavery along the Ottoman Borders (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2007), XIII.  The figure listed in this source 
is 30,000 gold ducats which I calculated and converted into akçe for the relevant years.  These calcultions 
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steady increase, which began in 1468, correlates with the establishment of Mehmed II’s 
Istanbul market and the entrance of the Ottomans as customers and tax collectors of the 
Crimean slave trade. 
 This increase is no coincidence.  As far as our primary sources tell us, slave raids by 
the khanate before 1475 were few in number when compared to those of the early 
sixteenth century.  Sources from the Latin and Greek m rchant communities in the 
Crimea indicate that while still profitable, the slave trade declined significantly after the 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the following regional turmoil, demonstrating 
how Constantinople/Istanbul had been a major node in a well-established slave trading 
system. The data show that once Mehmed II established the official slave markets, this 
trade restarted and prospered. It is therefore logical to say that the demand created by 
Constantinople and later Istanbul was a significant f ctor in determining the intensity of 
slave raids performed by the Crimean khans as it was driving force for demand. 
  Ottoman dependency on the revenue from taxing the slave trade should not be 
underestimated.  The Ottoman central budget counts taxes on the trade at 29 percent of 
total Ottoman revenue in the years 1577-78.66 Within one century revenue from the six 
major slave markets in the Empire amounted to almost one-third of the maliye’s67 budget. 
Kołodziejczyk averages slave tax revenues from the ports of Akkerman and Očakiv alone 
                                                                                                                                                                             
were based on a comparison between the exchange rate of ducats and akçe.  The Porte’s Revenue for 1526-
27 was published in ducats, which I converted to akçe using a contemporary and relevant figure, in this 
case the cost of Suleiman the Magnificent’s mosque which was 59 million akçe. 
66 Inalcik, Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, 283. 
67 This was the Ottoman finance department in Istanbul, an office that employed a large number of clerical 
offices and recorded Ottoman finances using an intricate double bookkeeping system.  They had many 
duties, the chief of which was to accurately record tax revenue and state expenditure.  For more information 
on the Maliye and its practices, see Linda T. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and 
Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660: Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage (Boston, 
Brill Academic Publishers, 1996). 
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to be at least 100,000 akçe per year.68 These ports were significantly less prominent in the 
region’s slave trade than were Uzak and Caffa and yet furnished large sections of the 
overall Ottoman budget.  These numbers reflect a startling reality of slave ownership in 
the Ottoman Empire.  A look at both elite and common strata reveal a culture inundated 
with slaves and with an ever increasing demand for them. 
Such a large source of revenue necessarily needed to be maintained and indeed 
increased.  This was not lost on the Porte.  Through t the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries the sultan maneuvered to increase the Port ’s power in Crimean internal affairs 
through both intervention and strong suggestion. The khan’s legitimacy may have been 
based on a Ghengisid bloodline and approval by the Karachi begs, but ultimately the 
financial backing of the sultan became necessary to the point that the sultan actually 
practiced veto power in the process of succession in the khanate by the late sixteenth 
century.69 
Ottoman control over Crimean affairs was powerful but far from absolute, and it 
eventually declined entirely after the period of study.  From the late fifteenth century to 
the late sixteenth century, however, the sultans’ ”liens de vassalit é”70 allowed them 
influential backing in khanate succession.  Alan Fisher recognizes the importance of the 
slave trade to the Crimean Khanate but does not tie it to an increasingly economically 
integrated relationship between the Porte and the khan.  He asserts rather that the khans 
                                                           
68 “Bernard Pretwicz i jego apologia na sejmie 1550 r.” [Bernard Pretwicz and his apology in the diet of 
1550], Biblioteka Warszawska, 1866, III, no. 7, p. 44-59, as quoted in Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “Slave 
Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterpris : The Northern Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth 
to Seventeenth Centuries,”  Oriente Moderno 25 (2006): 154. 
69 Paul R. Magocsi, History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples 2nd and Revised Edition (University of 
Toronto Press, 2010), 15. 
70 Bennigsen et al, Le Khanat de Crimée dans les archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapi, 5. 
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remained financially independent from the sultan throughout their existence.  The idea of 
a khanate with a central budgeting authority independent from direct Ottoman meddling 
is very probable.  However, between the Ottoman influe ce on khanate succession, 
imperial revenue from Crimean trade, and the manner in which the sultan is addressed in 
several pieces of correspondence, the evidence sugge ts suggests that at least before the 
eighteenth century, the khanate deferred to the sultan’s authority on a number of matters. 
 
Ottoman Islamic Tradition, Slavery, and Manumission 
 
The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic empire.  One of the eight tenets of the Ottoman 
Circle of Equity71 states that the sultan was the symbol of justice in the empire, which 
was legitimized by his adherence to the Islamic faith.  The sultan was thus very careful to 
at least be seen upholding Islamic principles.  ThePorte employed cohorts of religious 
scholars to review and interpret new firmans.72  
 It is odd then to realize how widespread slavery was in Anatolia.  While shari’a 
law permits slavery, it is a very limited form of slavery and manumission of slaves is 
considered pious, whether or not the emancipated party is Muslim.  This is not an 
apologist narrative.  Emancipation was extremely common.  Several fatwas were issued 
in the course of Ottoman history dealing with manumission of slaves.  One such law 
stated that if a master frees a slave while drunk or in jest that the words could not be 
                                                           
71 Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, 88. 
72 Firman is a Persian loan word into Turkish that roughly means “demand” or “decree.”  Firmans were the 
sultan’s most important tool in administering the empire.  These policies could range from Suleiman I’s 
sumptuary laws to fiscal policy to justifications for wars or retreats.  
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taken back and that many slaves gained legal protecti n after such events.73 There is little 
hard data to determine whether or not the volume of slave manumission in Anatolia 
remained uniform across three centuries.  The defterleri74 court inheritance registers held 
by courts do not necessarily mention property that was lost, that is, a manumitted slave.   
 What the Kadi court records do mention are some common practices and 
conditions for manumission.  Slavery in the Ottoman Empire was rarely a life-long event 
(although this certainly did happen) and the court records of Istanbul and Bursa are filled 
with contracts that would seem to parallel indentured servitude.  Ben Naeh’s study of 
Jewish slave ownership in the Ottoman Empire emphasizes this point and discusses a 
number of these contracts.75 Both Muslim and Jewish communities dealt with religious 
restrictions on interactions with slaves.  The Kadi records almost exclusively list female 
slaves of Slavic origins.76 Just as Muslim prescriptions for the treatment of slaves 
encouraged manumission as a pious act, Jewish slave own rs were subject to several 
rules regarding their female slaves, the most important of which was that the slave had to 
be sold or manumitted once she had engaged in sexual intercourse with her owner.77  
 These laws and social attitudes favoring manumission are the reason why 
Anatolia required a constant and growing supply of slaves.  As slaves were married off to 
freedmen or as their children became legally freed, d mand for slaves increased.   On the 
state’s end of business we can trace a few events which fed this demand for slaves, 
                                                           
73 Catalcali Ali, Fetava, 1:60-2; Imber, “Hanafi Law of Manumission,” typescript, 2, and his “Involuntary 
annulment of Marriage and Its Solution in Ottoman Law,” in Colin Imber, Studies in Ottoman History and 
Law (Istanbul, 1996), 217-51.  As quoted in Zilfi, Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire, 114. 
74 Inheritance registers held by religious courts throughout all of Anatolia.  Many of Turkey’s major cities 
have well preserved archives of these registers and are excellent sources for further scholarly work, 
especially in consumption studies. 





namely fundamental changes in agricultural and landsettlement practice as the empire 
expanded.  Likewise, we can look at lulls in the slave trade and in our graph and compare 
them to historical events which help us to explain them. 
 
Changes in Agricultural and Price Realities 
The Ottoman Empire was a highly centralized patrimonial system.  The majority of 
its revenue was exacted in the form of taxes on peasant labor based on the Çiftlik.78  
From the beginning of the empire to the first capitulations to the European powers79, 
agricultural industry was not profit driven.  Peasant  were expected to farm enough to 
feed their family and to pay the predetermined tax. This tradition protected peasants 
from the classical feudal exploitation experienced by their European counterparts, with 
several laws including the inability of the state to move free peasants to new lands 
arbitrarily.  As the empire expanded in all directions, especially after the reign of 
Suleiman, the state settled borderlands and engaged in profit-driven Çiftlik.  As peasants 
did have a modicum of protection, establishing these farms was most easily achieved 
with slaves.   
 Mehmed II’s plan to revitalize Istanbul and make it the new capital caused the 
creation of Khasslar lands occupied mostly by slaves in roughly 163 villages surrounding 
                                                           
78 Çiftlik were the most basic unit of Ottoman administrative and taxation practices.  Halil Inalc ik defines it 
as a household consisting of all labor- capable males nd cattle.  The number of these two things 
approximated the overall productive capacity of the family farm and the local Timar or tax farmer would 
adjust their taxation on the household accordingly. 
79 Capitulations were a series of economic agreements between the Porte and several European powers 
taken from a tradition going back to the Mameluke Sultanate.  In general they decreed that foreign 
merchants acting on behalf of participating kingdoms were not subject to regular Ottoman customs taxes 
and had certain rights in Ottoman courts.  For more on the capitulations see Halil Inalcik and Quataert, An 
Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: vol. 1, 1300-1600 
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Istanbul. These profit-driven farms caused some of the first major surges in demand for 
slaves in Anatolia, which coincides directly with the beginning trend in the graph, the 
conquest of Constantinople, and the establishment of the slave market in the years 
following 1453.   
 Khasslar lands decreased in use as time wore on from Mehmed II and the 
bureaucratization of the Crimean slave trade, so itwas certainly not the only driving force 
in Anatolia for slaves.  The beginning of the sixteenth century saw the inception of 
several popular revolts, namely the Celali Revolts.80  These revolts, which began in 1595, 
were a response of overtaxed peasants and de-housed timar holders to currency 
devaluation and the subsequent increase in taxes.  The revolts resulted in intermittent 
banditry throughout the sixteenth century and depopulated much of Anatolia’s farmland.  
The revolts occur in the middle of the graph’s gap r ther than the beginning.  Therefore 
the revolts did not initiate the downturn but remain  significant part of its continuation. 
 Coincidentally, these dates approximately describe the “dip” in figure 1.1.  The 
ensuing chaos of these popular uprisings in Turkey disrupted much of the economy from 
1595 to 1610.  This time period, during which commerce in major city centers in 
Anatolia were disrupted by a series of Janissary and peasant sieges, highly damaged the 
economy and the Porte became financially distracted in mitigating the effects of the 
revolts while also trying to rebuild.  This necessarily required a cut in spending, at least 
briefly, on the purchase of slaves.   
                                                           
80 Omer Lütfi Barkan and Justin McCarthy, “The Price R volution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning 
Point in the Economic History of the near East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, No. 1 
(Jan., 1975), 3-28.  
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This unrest is the reason why the second graph is divide  into two trend lines before 
and after this period.  While the graph shows that slave raiding as a variable dependent 
upon Anatolian demand still increased, the revolts which occurred in the middle of this 
period were a part of its temporary downturn.  This dive is large enough to suggest an 
overall negative trend when not taken with the outliers.  Despite this difficulty in data, 
over 65 percent of the points on the graph suggest a positive trend before and after this 
traumatic event.   
Popular consumption likely decreased immensely during this period due to both the 
Celali revolts and what Barkan and McCarthy call the rise of European market 
dominance.  He utilizes price registers from Edirne to show that consumption in general 
decreased as a result of heavily inflated prices.  This period marks the start of a forty-six 
percent average price inflation.81 While slaves are not specifically mentioned in the 
account, silk and grains are.  It is reasonable to assume that if bulk consumption of these 
commodities diminished, then conspicuous consumption such as of slaves would also 
decrease. 
 Slave ownership in the Ottoman Empire was by no means r re.  It was, however, 
subject to heavy regulation from religious and state authorities.  Cultural attitudes toward 
manumission and piety complemented these regulations, creating an environment that 
could feasibly cycle out slaves every five years and require replenishment from non-
Muslim, outside sources, namely the services provided by the khanate. 
                                                           
81  Barkan and McCarthy, “The Price Revolution of theSixteenth Century,” 9. 
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 As earlier noted, slave consumption was not necessarily uniform, although in 
general it tended to increase.  The low points of consumption are easily explained by 
Anatolia’s greatest economic crisis since its rough beginnings.  The Celali Revolts and 
the rise of the European market system brought inflat on, domestic disorder, and a 
distinct fall in consumption as citizens could no longer afford conspicuous consumption 










Over the course of three centuries the Crimean Khanate raided and pillaged Southern 
Russia in order to feed an ever-growing slave market which was centered in Istanbul.  
Both parties had specific interests which defined how the trade in this taboo commodity 
would affect their states.  As slave raiding became the major source of income for the 
Crimean Tatars, the frequency of raiding became dirctly influenced by Anatolia’s need 
for slaves.  Consequently, events and attitudes in Anatolia are reflected in a graph of this 
commodity. The sheer volume of slaves used in Anatolia in both elite and common 
circles shows that slaves were in demand.  Islamic ttitudes toward slavery, especially the 
practice of manumission, which created a non-recycling slave population that had to be 
replaced from without, shows partially why this demand increased.  The 
bureaucratization of the slave trade by the Porte once they learned they could make 
immense amounts of money by taxing the trade further emphasized the increase in 
demand for slaves.  More slave raiding and trading meant more tax revenues from the 
Porte.  Inversely, the one major downward fluctuation in the slave trade represented on 
the graph happens to partially coincide with the Celali Revolts, which provided the 
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greatest amount of domestic unrest the Empire had seen ince the incursions of 
Tamerlane and the ten year interregnum period.  Despite this dip, the data afterward still 
trend upward, therefore falling in line with the theory that even through economic 
instability, the demand for slavery and hence slave r iding trended upward.   
 The numbers presented in this study, both the estimations of slaves taken by the 
Crimean Khanate per annum and the amount of money made by the Porte from this trade, 
are the best estimations at present available to show a direct correlation between Ottoman 
demand and financial power and the slave raiding activities of the Crimean Khanate. 
 This study lacks one very significant event which dates directly to the data.  In 
1571, the Crimean Khanate, led by Devlet Giray I, sacked Moscow and killed or captured 
thousands.82 The data derived from Fisher confirms this number to be one hundred 
thousand.  This was a significant event and a scholarly study into this event would clarify 
the Crimean-Ottoman relationship further and should be a continued topic of study in the 
near future.  I have chosen not to include this event b cause I wish to focus exclusively 
on Crimean-Anatolian relations. 
 Ultimately the correlations of data between khanate slave raiding and Anatolian 
economics suggest a very clear but perhaps unintentional relationship of mutual 
economic interdependency.  The more economically powerful partner of the two, the 
Ottoman Empire, unconsciously affected the power structure and the economic activities, 
namely slave raiding, of the other due to this interdependence.  This relationship is 
important to understand and know because it links events in disparate localities.  It links 
                                                           
82  Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, (Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 45. 
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several economic circles, elite and popular.  Most importantly, it suggests a core-
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Analysis on Figure 1.1 by David Phillip Arthur Craig
To assess the correlation between time and the number of captives, a linear regression was 
performed on these data. However, as number of captives is not a continuous quantity and as the 
required normality and homogeneity assumptions are clearly violated by these data, a significance 
assessment was not performed. A slight positive trend was observed when considering all data 
points from Figure 1(r = 0.115; n = 36; R2 = .0132); however, this trend was driv
outlying data point from 1676, for removing this data point produced a very slight negative trend 
as depicted in Figure 2 (r = 
observed trend largely depends on a single,
based on evidence provided above, if a difference i number of captives prior to 1575 is observed 
when compared to the number of captives after 1575. To begin to probe this question, two 
regressions were perfo med for data points occurring before or after 1575. Reducing the range of 
data points predictably inflated the observed trends as depicted in Figure 3; prior to 1575, a lower 
relationship between time and number of captives (r = 0.04349; n = 15; R2 = 0.
observed compared to the relationship between time and number of captives after 1575 (r = 
0.3787; n = 21; R2 = 0.1892). Again, this effect was driven by the outlying data point from 1676; 
with this point removed, the relationship between time and
considering data points after 1575 (r = 0.1674; n = 20; R2 = 0.0271) as depicted in Figure 4. 
Simply stated, assessing differences between the number of captives before 1575 compared to 
after 1575 is not conclusive when
outlier from 1676. 
As some sort of distribution comparison is required n most investigations in the humanities, a 




-0.0412; n = 35; R2 = .0017). Clearly, assessing the direction of the 
 outlying data point. The main question becomes, 
 number of captives was reduced when 
 using an aggregate assessment (e.g. regression) due to the 
i
en by a single, 
1892) was 
 normality, and 
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homogeneity assumptions required for null hypothesis significance testing, as well as the 
pronounced, over-exaggerated effect of the outlying data point from 1676, a non-aggregated data 
analysis technique is required to properly assess these data. Observation Oriented Modeling 
(Grice, 2011; Grice, Barrett, Schlimgen, and Abramson, 2012) is a data analysis technique allows 
comparisons of observed data to expected patterns of outcomes and then to evaluate the 
differences with an accuracy index and a randomization test. This technique has been successfully 
used in behavioral learning data (Craig, Grice, Varnon, Gibson, Sokolowski, and Abramson, 
2012; Dinges et al., 2013). Observation Oriented Modeling (OOM) assesses individual 
observations and does not rely on traditional summaries of data such as measures of central 
tendency or variability. Using these methods successfully eschews the assumptions of null 
hypothesis significance testing (e.g. continuity, normality, homogeneity).   
Within OOM, two ordinal analyses were conducted. Ordinal analyses produce a percent correct 
classification (PCC) value and a chance-value (a probability statistic). For each analysis, an 
observed PCC value was computed by comparing an a priori ordinal prediction with direct pair-
wise comparisons of the observed data. The resulting PCC value ranges from 0 to 100 and is the 
percent of the observed data that matches the expected pattern. Higher values indicate more 
observations were correctly classified by the prediction. Next, a randomization process wherein 
the observed data were randomly shuffled between groups/conditions was repeated 1000 times 
for each ordinal analysis to create a range of randomized PCC values. The observed PCC values 
were then compared to the randomized range of PCC values to compute a chance value (c-value). 
The c-value ranges from 0 to 1 and displays the proportion of randomized versions of the 
observed data that yielded PCC values greater than or equal to the observed data’s PCC value. 
For example, a c-value of .001 indicates the observed PCC value was larger than 999 of the PCC 
values obtained from 1000 randomized versions of the data. However, as c-values are calculated 
from randomizations of the observed data points, each PCC value is assessed on an adaptable 
distribution that is based on observed data rather than a hypothetical distribution (e.g., the 
standard normal curve). Dinges et al. (2013) describes numerous philosophical and practical 
differences between Observational Oriented Modeling versus null hypothesis significance testing 
and contains and compares data sets analyzed via both methods.  
To perform this assessment, the data were split at 1575 and two predictions were made. The first 
prediction agrees with the provided a priori theory and posits more captives would be observed 
before 1575 compared to after 1575. Indeed, this prediction was supported (PCC = 65.05; c-value 
< 0.001). The second prediction counters the provided a priori theory and posits fewer captives 
would be observed before 1575 compared to after 1575. Indeed, this prediction was not supported 
(PCC = 33.33; c-value = 1.00). In short, 65.05% of the observed individual data points fit the 
prediction that more captives were observed before 1575 compared to after 1575. 
 






Combination Observations created for Empty Data Set 
 
  Orderings :  
     ord_1 
     ord_2 
 
  Every observation (as it appears in the Data Window) in each of the 2 orderings (or cases) was 
paired with every 
  other observation in the 2 orderings (or cases). This process created 441 new ordered 
observations (cases). 
 




Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Combination Orderings 
 
Classification Imprecision value = 0 
 
Ordinal Classifications = Full pattern of ordinal re ations 
 
Missing Values = Omitted from Totals 
 
Analyze: Entered Numbers Analyzed 
    1450-1600    Min = 2000.00    Max = 200000.00 





Ordering Frequency Summaries 
 
    1450-1600    Units : 11     Missing : 126    Observations : 315    
    1600-1750    Units : 21     Missing : 0      Observations : 441    
       Totals    Units : 32     Missing : 126    Observations : 756    
 
 
Defined Pattern : All Observations 
 
   1450-1600 
   | 1600-1750 
   + O Highest 
   O + Lowest 
 
 
Classification Results : All Observations 
 
     Ordinal Relations between Pairs of Observations Classified According to the Defined 
Pattern(s) 
 
         Classifiable Pairs of Observations : 315 
                    Correct Classifications : 205 
            Percent Correct Classifications : 65.08 
 
                Classifiable Complete Cases : 315 
55 
 
        Correctly Classified Complete Cases : 205 
           Percent Correct Classified Cases : 65.08 
 
 
Randomization Results : All Observations 
 
         Observed Percent Correct Classifications : 65.08 
 
                      Number of Randomized Trials : 1000 
                   Minimum Random Percent Correct : 40.00 
                   Maximum Random Percent Correct : 59.37 
               Values >= Observed Percent Correct : 0 
                                    Model c-value : l ss than ( 1 / 1000); that is, < 0.001 
 
 
        Observed Percent Correct Classified Cases : 65.08 
 
                      Number of Randomized Trials : 1000 
             Minimum Random Percent Correct Cases : 40.00 
             Maximum Random Percent Correct Cases : 59.37 
         Values >= Observed Percent Correct Cases : 0 
                                    Model c-value : l ss than ( 1 / 1000); that is, < 0.001 
 
 




Classification Imprecision value = 0 
 
Ordinal Classifications = Full pattern of ordinal re ations 
 
Missing Values = Omitted from Totals 
 
Analyze: Entered Numbers Analyzed 
    1450-1600    Min = 2000.00    Max = 200000.00 
    1600-1750    Min = 1400.00    Max = 400000.00 
 
 
Ordering Frequency Summaries 
 
    1450-1600    Units : 11     Missing : 126    Observations : 315    
    1600-1750    Units : 21     Missing : 0      Observations : 441    
       Totals    Units : 32     Missing : 126    Observations : 756    
 
 
Defined Pattern : All Observations 
 
   1450-1600 
   | 1600-1750 
   O + Highest 





Classification Results : All Observations 
 
     Ordinal Relations between Pairs of Observations Classified According to the Defined 
Pattern(s) 
 
         Classifiable Pairs of Observations : 315 
                    Correct Classifications : 105 
            Percent Correct Classifications : 33.33 
 
                Classifiable Complete Cases : 315 
        Correctly Classified Complete Cases : 105 
           Percent Correct Classified Cases : 33.33 
 
 
Randomization Results : All Observations 
 
         Observed Percent Correct Classifications : 33.33 
 
                      Number of Randomized Trials : 1000 
                   Minimum Random Percent Correct : 40.32 
                   Maximum Random Percent Correct : 57.46 
               Values >= Observed Percent Correct : 1000 
                                    Model c-value : 1.00 
 
 




                      Number of Randomized Trials : 1000 
             Minimum Random Percent Correct Cases : 40.32 
             Maximum Random Percent Correct Cases : 57.46 
         Values >= Observed Percent Correct Cases : 1000 
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